Private Security after 9/11 Essay

The conveyance Security Administration Two months after the 9/11 attacks, the Congress canonic the breeze and point Security manage or what is cognise as the ATSA, creating what is known as the Transportation Security Administration (The Heritage 2006). According to the assumptions to the federalization of airport surety, all passengers are uniformly suspicious and should have similar analysis, and the principal aim of the airport security is to observe and confiscate hazardous objects such as knives, bombs and guns, resulting to the creation of TSA which cause an extensive cost without making Americans perceptively safer (The Heritage, 2006).Transportation Security Administration or the TSA which is a part of the Aviation and transportation Security Act ratified by the US Congress and signed by George W. Bush on November 19, 2001 is a United States government agency that was formed immediately after the tragedies at the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 200 1 (TSA 2007). The TSA was originally structured in the U.S. surgical incision of Transportation but on March 01, 2003 was reassigned to the US Department of Homeland Security with the responsibility for the safety of the untaughts dust of transportations.With the regional, local, and state partners, the Transportation Security Agency with approximately 50,000 employees, watches over and administer the security and safety of railroads, buses, ports, transit systems, highways, and 450 United States logical argumentports (TSA 2007). Among the airports includes the Sioux Falls Regional Airport and the San Francisco International Airport, which uses private security under contract with the Transportation and Security Administration in inspecting passengers and al-Qaida gages. The TSA is responsible in the safety and protection of all types of transportation such as rail, pipelines & highways, and aviation in which the huge majority of its employees can be found.Before the creation of TSA the security screening is managed by the private companies who had contracts with either, a terminal, an airline or an airport operator. Private security agencies have been authorized by the Transportation and Security Administration in providing security but these agencies are under the permission or approval of the TSA. TSA was assigned in the capturement of policies in ensuring the security and safety of every forms of transportation especially the US air traffic. The Transportation and Security Administration supervise the Federal Air Marshall table service until it was shifted to the US Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in December 1, 2003, and in the US Governments fiscal year in 2006, the Federal Air Marshall Program was shifted back again to the TSA.The TSA is accountable for operation in screening passengers items and luggage in all US Commercial airports, and combating baggage theft in many airports. TSA has also receives many criticisms concerning airp ort operations and this includes, complaints mistreatment of invasion privacy, engaging I security theater, theft of airline passenger possessions, sales of items serene from passengers, skipping security checks, failure on the use of common sense and judgment, and failure to screen and detect fake bombs brought by an undercover TSA agent. Intense implementation deadlines necessary by the US Congress, limited terminal space, high investment on baggage screening equipments, and limited number of screeners, combined to generate huge inefficiencies and because of this $2.5 one thousand million dollars have been spent just for the baggage screening equipments as of September 2004 in spite of high error rate and starting time work of the pricey explosive detection system or EDS.Transportation Security Today Before September 11, 2001, transportation safety within the United States was restricted in purpose and in degree. Total federal spending for all transportation security was les s than $200 million a year, with most of that devoted to passenger aviation. Subway surveillance cameras and transit police sought detect or stop criminal activity, and customs agents at ports look for smugglers. The just division that had veritable essential resources and security policy awareness from the US Federal Government, the importance was tremendously shifted overseas (William Johnstone, 2006, p. 1). Many have explained the success of the 9/11 attacks as mainly the result of imperfect intelligence, but the available evidence indicates the primary negligence was that of the aviation security system.The whole history of the system, as well as the testimony received by the 9/11 Commission indicates that its defenses could only respond effectively with the kind of actionable and particularized intelligence that all maintain is always in short supply (William Johnstone, 2006, p. 2). The federal government responded to the 9/11 with a flurry of congressional and Executive Br anch initiatives, including the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), which created the Transportation Security Administration to be responsible for the security of all modes of transportation and established the deadlines for the implementation of the a number of specific aviation security measures, the Marine Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) which mold the security guidelines for ports and ships, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) which established new department of homeland Security (DHS) by combining twenty two separate federal agencies, including TSA, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Federal Management Agency (FEMA)The 2002 legislation creating the 9/11 Commission which was to examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to preve nt acts of terrorism, a series of Homeland Security Presidential directives (HSPDS), including the December 2003 HSPD-& which called for DHAS to produce a comprehensive integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection, and lastly, the intelligence service Reform and Terrorism Prevention act of 2004 which turned many of the 9/11 commissions recommendation including those relating to transportation security into statutory mandates (William Johnstone, 2006).The change magnitude federal policy attention was accompanied by a substantial rise in federal funding for the Transportation Security, which rose from less than $ one hundred fifty million in Fiscal years (FY) 2001 to more than $7.7 billion in FY2005, but four years after 9/11, after a several, a series of federal laws, reorganization, and executive directives, after more than $25 billion in few federal security investments, major questions remain about the force of all the elements of the new sy stem.Aviation SecurityWith the layers of aviation security the intelligence security sector of the TSA is more pertinent to decision and leadership of its agency doing mathematical operation than its forerunner in the FAA, but even if it is two times as large as its forerunner, it stays considerably understaffed and its agents are now distributed untold fewer with duties for the modes of transportation not just in aviation (William Johnstone, 2006). Development has been recounted in perimeter security of airports through a lowering in the plan of attack points of airports, an rise in vehicles entering airports and in, surveillance of individuals and some enhancements in background checks of airport employee, though, small has varied in the divided responsibilities of the old systems for access statement, with US Federal Government, and to a lesser degree the airlines all having a function (p. 6). General aviation security has not been substantially has not been substantially up graded, with neighbor pilots, passengers, baggage, nor cargo subjected to security screening, and threat and vulnerability has assessment have yet to be undertaken for most general aviation airports. A December 2004 Congressional report, criticized TSA for failing to understand the pretend from small private planes, provide useful threat information to general aviation airports, and enforce security compliance by charter airlines and flight schools (p. 6).Similar weaknesses persist to continue in air cargo security, and reportedly only 5% of all cargo is presently screened, and the GAO has say that carrying cargo aircraft persist to be highly susceptible to sabotage of terrorist. TSA has stated sets of regulation for security of air cargo but usual for rule making, the mathematical function is progressing very slowly, and even if concluded, the new rules would give fewer features on how freight industry, which is anticipated to execute the security program, is to perform this gro undless mandates (p. 6). Four years of handout through have educated us that the United States government cant do the work emend compared to the private sector and this should not get as unexpected because absolutely every nation that has utilized government screeners has reached similar conclusion (The Heritage, 2006). When nations first attempt to prevent airline seize in the 1970s, most countries originally used government staffs to enhance security at airports through justice agency or government transportation, and in the undertake of the 1980s the European airports starts developing a performance contracting model with which the government impose and establish high performance standard with which airports did by employing security companies.Belgium was the 1st to do this mode in 1982, in 1983 this was emulated by the Netherlands, in 1987 by the United Kingdom, and a new wave of conversions to the public private confederation model in 1990s, in 1992 with Germany, 1993 in France, 1994 in Austria and Denmark, 1998 in Ireland and Poland, and 1999 in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland (The Heritage, 2006).The GAO examined the security inspection methods of Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom reporting the excellent performance of airports in Europe using the performance contracting model. The GAO state the four parts of the important differences between European and US screening practices at the time, and these are, better overall security system design, higher training and qualifications prerequisite for screeners, better pay and benefits resulting in much lower turnover rates, and screening task presumptuousness with the national government or the airport and not with airlines (The Heritage, 2006).Reactive System In the 1990 the Presidential Commission on Aviation and terrorism, which itself had been established only after the Pan AM 103 disaster, reported to the nation that the FAA was a reactive agency preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in outlook of future threats (William Johnstone, 2006). The main features of the pre 9/11 security system can be summarized as anti-hijacking measures (including checkpoint screening, profiling, and air marshals, the anti-sabotage measures including X-ray screening and positive passenger bag match at high risk airports, and additional measure such as explosive detection equipment, canine teams, and CAPPS (William Johnstone, 2006).Unpromising FutureThe hope for any important improvement in baggage and passenger security are depressing because instead of tasking each airport with securing its operations under the National restrictive Supervision as is ordinary in most other countries, Congress tackle the 9/11 failure of security by instructing in the Transportation Security Administration not only the regulatory responsibility but also the service provision duties of the airport screening (The Heritage, 2006). Th e TSA served as two(prenominal) an operator and passenger screener while the perimeter patrols, access control and law enforcement duties were to be done by the airports themselves under the FSD administration, creating a serious conflict of interest.The indispensableness for Legislation Primarily, the fault cannot be attributed alone with the TSA, but with the Congress which directed how the US government must tackle the problem, the Congress selected in concentrating on how the US government could make the pre 9/11 security check better rather than directing the vital issue of searching for the most effective and in effect(p) method to stop terrorist off the plane. The Congress formed the problem and solving it will make Congress law to reshape the US government on the duties of stopping terrorist more willingly than chargeing on the passengers luggage. The congress can begin by shifting the TSA into a much more different Aviation security Agency, and the Congress should push the US Government to get out of the screening business and transfer screening to airports, obliging only that they authorize contracts, set performance standards, and observe compliance (The Heritage, 2006).The new ASA should enforce and set standards focusing on, certification of security companies with which an agency of the US Government evaluates the backgrounds of its directors and officers and financial constancy of each firms, licensing of individual workers, initially as skillful security officers and then as specialized aviation agents, standards for benefits and salary to guarantee that people of highly skilled employees are hired and that they are motivated to stay with the company, and lastly, training of operating personnel and managers (The Heritage, 2006).A New Model for Aviation SecurityThe DHS should focus its attention to the development of the 21st century cargo system and international passenger security system that doesnt waste resources by considering every big money and person as an equal risk that needs screening and checks. A new model system should distribute resources of security in comparison with the risk or danger, counting on what is called as focused security that place the most resources alongside with the highest risks.An enhanced risk based approach to recognize flagitious persons would make separation of passengers within the checkpoints of terminals into at least three distinct groups according to the quality and quantity of information known about each, such low risk passengers with which great deal is known, ordinary passengers or persons who are mostly infrequent flyers and leisure travelers, and high risk passengers or people whom nothing is known or having negative information about them. Also, different actions for bag and passenger screening should be done with each group to have an efficient system resources and passenger time allotment on methods that give little to the security of airport.The risk based appro ach would give noteworthy cost savings to both operating cost and capital while aiming funds of the airport security toward the passengers who are expected to pose threats to property and people, and those savings could be utilized to develop security in other areas and lower the passenger, airline, airport, and taxpayers cost (The Heritage, 2006). The risk based model would also lower the cost and size of canvass baggage screening, and the bags of RT members could be screened through X ray machines, lowering the EDS machines demand.ConclusionThe US Congress can assist to tackle the countrys airport security requirement more effectively by insisting the 3 essential changes such as, re pass watering the TSAs mission from giving airport security to being a policymaker of the aviation security, devolving screening responsibility to the airport level under the authorization of a director of the federal security, and lastly, requiring that the DHS labor to construct a new cargo and pass enger security system that utilize a risk based model for the security of airports (The Heritage, 2006).ReferencesBurns, V., Peterson, D. (2005). Terrorism A Documentary and Reference Guide. New York Greenwood Press.TSA Transportation Security Administration. (2007). What Is TSA?. RetrievedDecember 23 2007, from http//www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is_tsa.shtmThe Heritage Foundation. (2006). Time to Rethink Airport Security. Retrieved December23 2007, from http//www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1955.cfmWilliams C. (2004). air crew Security. New York Ashgate Publishing Ltd.William Johnstone, R. (2006). 9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security. New York Greenwood Press.